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ON THE NAVAHO TRAIL: THE CAMPAIGN OF 1860-61
By MAX L. HEYMAN, JR.*
Mayto July of 1860, two and a half regiments of the
United States Army moved from the Department of
Utah into the Department of New Mexico. l The reason for
their transfer is to be found in the Report of the Secretary of
War for 1860: "In New Mexico, the outrages and depredations of the Indians have been very daring and numerous,
and nearly the whole territory may be said to have been infested by them throughout the season." To chastise the red
man, then; "in an exemplary manner," was the duty for
which the troops were called into the Territory. And the
particular object of their endeavors was to be "the numerous
and powerful tribe of Navajoes."2
Trouble between the Navaho Indians and the Spanishspeaking population of New Mexico stretched back to the
beginning of the eighteenth century.3 In the twelve years
immediately preceding the American conquest of the Territory, Navaho incursions had been extremely severe. 4 In
the twelve years since that time, the warriors of the
Navaho Nation had caused more trouble to the citizens of
New Mexico than any other Indian tribe. 5
During these years, a desultory warfare was carried on.
The Navaho raided the camps and settlements of the Territory for the purpose of stealing stock. Mexican women and
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*Max L. Heyman, Jr., is a graduate student, Department of History, University of
California at Los Angeles.
1. The 5th and 7th Infantry Regiments, three companies of the 10th Infantry.
and two companies of the 2d Dragoons. See General Orders No. 10, April 16, 1860,
Department of Utah, General Orders and Special Orders, 1860. This material and the
Adjutant General's Office and Department of New Mexico items hereinafter referred
to are to be found in the War Records Division of the National Archives in Washington. D. C. Also see Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy to Colonel L. Thomas, A. A. G., Headquarters of the Army. August 5, 1860, in the Report of the Secretary of War in
Senate Exec. Doc. No.1. 36th Cong., 2d sess., II, 60.
2. Senate Exec. Doc. No.1, 36th Cong.• 2d sess., II, 3.
3. Hubert Howe Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico (San Francisco. 1889), 222-

223.

4. Frank D. Reeve, "The Government and the Navaho, 1846-1858," New Mexico
Historical Review. XIV (January. 1939). 82-83.
5. Bancroft, op. cit., 673.
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children captured on these forays were enslaved or sold to
distant tribes. Only incidentally, however, did the Navaho
kill during these assaults. On the other hand, when Mexican
elements wished to enrich themselves in flocks and herds,
they made inroads upon the Navaho. Captives were likewise
enslaved 6 and, by 1861, it was estimated that the residents
of New Mexico held over 1,500 of these people in bondage.
Even the governor of the Territory was said to own Navaho
slaves. 7
.
No doubt, many of the depredations blamed on the
Navaho were not of their doing. But more were, and numerous punitive expeditions, public and private (the latter is
how New Mexicans often gained materially), were sent
against them. In 1858, a nominal peace existed. Yet, only a
minor incident was needed to rupture it. Such an incident
occurred. Thenceforth, except for the quiet winter of 185859, the Navahos raided at wilL8
Continued successful forays, even within sight of the
capital of the Territory, gave these warriors such confidence
in their bravery and prowess that, on April 30, 1860, they
became so bold as to attack Fort Defiance-a garrisoned
military post.9 It was this imprudent action on the part of a
Navaho war party that provoked the Secretary of War into
ordering that drastic steps be taken to quell the tribe. lO
At Fort Garland,!l late in August, Major Edward R. S.
Canby, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, Tenth Infantry,!2 received a letter from Captain D. H. Maury, Assistant Adju6. Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880," New
Mexico Historical Review, XII (July, 1937), 221.
7. Oscar H. Lipps, The Navajos (Cedar Rapids, 1909), 54-55.
8. Reeve, HThe Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico," loco cit., 223 e't seq.
9. For the report of the attack, see Senate Exec. Doc. No. I, 36th Cong., 2d sess.,
II, 52-56.
10. Major W. A. Nichols, A. A. G., to Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy, July 14, 1860,
ibid., 60.

11. At this time Fort Garland was in the Territory of New Mexico. At present,

and since the Colorado Territory was formed, it is located in south-central Colorado.

12. In 1860, Canby was forty-three years old. He had graduated from West
Point in 1839, after which he served in the Florida War until 1842. On frontier service along the Great Lakes from 1842-1846, he participated in the Mexican War as as-

sistant adjutant general, emerging with two brevet. He served in California from

1849-1851, took part in the "Monnon War" of 1857-1858, and commanded Fort Bridger,
1858-1860, before coming to New Mexico. Following his service in the Navaho campaign.

he commanded the Department of New Mexico, 1861-1862, during the Confederate In-
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tant General, in Santa Fe. Part of its contents read as
follows:
The Department Commander directs me to say that he has decided
to commence active operations against the Navajos at once, and he
wishes you to conduct them. . . . in carrying out these operations he
desires to entrust the greatest possible discretion to you . . . he has
selected you for this duty accordingly.13

Thus was Lieutenant Colonel Canby notified of his assignment to command the Navaho Expedition.
The campaign was planned to last six weeks in October
and November. The troops, in three columns, were to converge on Fort Defiance from their stat'ions in different
sections of the Territory and, from that rendezvous, we're to
invade the heart of the Navaho country and punish those
"audacious predatory hordes."14 The Superintendent of Indian Affairs, although he usually frowned on the use of one
tribe in fighting another, consented to the employment of
the Pueblo and Ute Indians as spies and guides for the military in this expedition against the "common scourge."15
Canby marched for Fort Defiance on September 10. 16
Under orders to "seize and destroy the crops" in all the
Navaho planting grounds that his column might come upon,t7
he led the troops southwestward via Abiquiu and Canon
Largo. 18 The command didn't reach Fort Defiance, where the
vasion of the Territory. He was one of those administrative generals' (he ultimately,.

became a brigadier general in the regular army) whose light has been hidden by the
more dashing of their brethren-in-arms. He was what might be considered a military
assistant secretary of war from 1862-1864. He commanded the Military Division of
West Mississippi, 1864-1865; and was military governor in three of the southern districts during Reconstruction. He was killed in northern California by the Modoc Indians in April, 1873. Asketch of his life may be found in the Dictionary of American
Biography. N. B.: The author of this article now has in preparation a biography of
Canby.
13. Maury to Canby, Department of New Mexico, Letters Sent, X, 455, No. 187.
(Department of New Mexico will hereinafter be cited as Dept. of N. M. and Letters
Sent, LS.)
14. Ibid.

Also see Fauntleroy to Thomas, August 26, 1860, Senate Exec. Doc. No.
36th Cong., 2d sess., II, 63.
15. J. L. Collins to Maury, September 5, 1860, Dept. of N. M. Letters Received,
C30a, 1860. (Letters Received hereinafter cited as LR.)
.
16. With three officers and 115 enlisted men. Canby to A. A. G., September 9, 1860,
ibid., C32a, 1860.
.
17. Fauntleroy to Thomas, September 9, 1860, Senate Exec. Doc. No.1. 36th Cong.,
2d sess., II, 64.
18. Canby to A. A. G., September 19, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, C34a, 1860.
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other columns were anxiously awaiting its arrival,19 until
October 4-three days later than Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy,
the department commander, had anticipated. 20
But Canby had expected to be late, and had therefore
requested that the commanders of the other detachments
have their reports and returns ready so that there would be
no unnecessary delay in organizing the troops once he did
arrive. 21 Yet, in spite of this and other attempts to forsee
any possible contingencies that might retard the prompt
initiation of the operations,22 considerable delay was experienced in outfitting and supplying the fifteen companies
assigned to the command. 23
Canby was able to put two detachments of 270 men each
into the field by October 11. A third, smaller, division followed them on the thirteenth. In converging on Fort Defiance, the troops had driven the Navaho from their haunts
in the Chusca and Tunicha Mountains westward toward the
Sierra Limita, beyond which it was understood they could
not gO.24 In that direction, then, the columns were pointed.
Canby expected to corner the Navaho there and "inflict
punishment . . . signal in its results and lasting in its
effects."
Disturbing, however, was the fact that a want of adequate supplies further restricted the time allotted to the
operations. Canby expressed the feeling that it would be
unfortunate if the stores were exhausted before he· attained
the ends desired, or the failure of his plan was fully demonstrated. He hoped that an additional force and more transportation and subsistence would soon be forthcoming, so
that he could increase the size of the third section and thus
extend the scope of the operations. As it was, there was
19. Major H. H. Sibley to Maury, September 29, 1860,· ibid.
20. See Maury to Canby, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 455, No. 187.
21. Canby to A. A. G., September 6, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, C31, 1860.
22. See id. to id., September 9, 1860. ibid., C32a, 1860, requesting clothing for the
troops and equipment for the animals.
23. There were six companies of cavalry and nine of infantry~ and fifty BCOUts.
See Fauntleroy to Thomas, September 9, 1860, Senate Exec. Doc. No.1, 36th Cong., 2d
sess., II, 63.
24. Canby to A. A. G., October 4, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, C39, 1860.
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equipment available for but two companies of the third
division, and bacon rations fqr only ten days.25
Leaving Captain Lafayette McLaws to command the
rear echelon and the dwarfed third detachment, Canby
headed the First Column as it took the field. 26 Leading his
men along the north side of the Canon· de Chelle, he was
joined by the Second Column, coming up from the south,
on October 19. The Third Column, meanwhile, acted as a
holding force to prevent the escape to the southeast of any
Navaho who managed to elude the maneuvers of the other
two divisions. The Ute allies scourged the country between
the sections,27 and succeeded in capturing fifty or sixty
horses and about 300 sheep. But when they failed to meet the
troops at the mouth of the canon, Canby wryly observed, "I
apprehend that they are satisfied and have gone home."28
Now commanding the united forces, the lieutenant
colonel employed his cavalry to reconnoiter the country in
the neighborhood of the Mesa de la Vaca. Finding it impossible to penetrate the mesa, he reluctantly abandoned that
course. 29 The route taken on the next phase of the patrol
traversed a picturesque region of red sand-stone formations.
But the scenery offered little compensation, because the trail
was heavy and very distressing to the animals. On one day,
the column covered twenty-one miles, during which the
mounts began to "yield sadly."30 One result of these initial
operations was to render the horses entirely unserviceable
for the rest of thecampaign. 31 Yet, it was not the demands
that Canby placed upon the cavalry that completely unfitted
it for further action.
25. Id. to id., October 12, 1860, ibid., C41, 1860.
26. ACtually, he remained behind one day, and caught up with it at Palo Negro.
Ibid. Also see Lt. O. G. Wagner, A. A. A. G., to Captain Lafayette McLaws, October
11, 1860, ibid., W33, 1860.
27. Canby to A. A. A. G., November 8, 1860, ibid., C49, 1860. Also see Maury to
Fauntleroy, October 20, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 489, No. 269.
28. Canby to A. A. G., October 19, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, Enclosure in C49,
1860.
29. Id to id., November 8, 1860, ibid., C49, 1860.
30. Sibley to Wagner, November 12, 1860, ibid., Enclosure in C53, 1860.
31. See id. to id., November 8, 1860, Adjutant General's Office, LR, Enclosure in
124 New Mexico Department, 1860. (Adjutant General's Office hereinafter cited as
A. G. 0.)
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Due to an unprecedented drought, this was the second
year of famine in New Mexico. 32 At only four camps during
the scout were the essential requisites of water and grass
combined in sufficient amounts to improve the animals. Many
places where the guides had assured him that there was
water, Canby found none. The animals were forced to do
without, or had to drink the saline, "bitter" waters of the
desert. Its consumption often proved fatal, even to horses in
apparently fine condition. 33
Canby surmised that the lack of water would force the
Navaho to bring their stock to one of the few permanent
springs. He therefore moved the command so as to block off
the avenues of approach to water-but to no avai1. 34
Failing in this attempt to trap the Navaho, another
reconnaissance was ordered. It revealed that many of the
quarry, with "immense" herds and flocks, were fleeing
South. and West in the direction of the Moqui villages and
the Little Colorado. 35 But, at the same time, the actions of
other members of the tribe were quite provoking, especially
to Brevet Major H. H. Sibley, Canby's second-in-command.
These Navaho displayed "a persistent determination" to
hang on the skirts of the moving column in small parties.
They were "very numerous and bold, coming in sight of the
troops in large numbers on the high mesas [above] the route
[of march]." 36 They annoyed the column "in every way
consistent with their individual safety," yet they were not
disposed to fight. And that exasperated Sibley. With the
military advantages all in their favor, the major was "forciblystruck" by "the futile efforts of this cowardly tribe" to
inflict any real damage on the troops.37 From a psychological
32. J. L. Donaldson, A. Q. M., to Fauntleroy, November 13, 1860, ibid., N1l9, 1860.
33. See Canby's endorsement on Sibley to Wagner, November 8, 1860, ibid., 124
New Mexico Department, 1860.
34. See Sibley to Lt. L. L. Rich, November 12, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, Enclosure in C53, 1860.
35. Canby to A. A. G., November 8, 1860, ibid., C49, 1860.
36. Colonel C. Carson to Captain Benj. C. Cutler, A. A. G., August 31, 1863, The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, vol. XXVI, pt. i, 251. (Hereinafter cited as OR and all references will be to Series I.)
37. Sibley to Rich, November 12, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, Enclosure in C53, 1860.
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standpoint, though, they seemed to be doing a pretty good
job, particularly in so far as Major Sibley was concerned.
After nearly a month in the field, Canby returned to Fort
Defiance. The "almost total destitution" of water and grass
had limited the operations considerably. The results were
not decisive. Twenty-eight Indians had been killed by the
troops, 360 horses and 2,000 sheep taken. In addition, the
Utes had killed six Navaho, captured 600 horses and 5,000
sheep.38 This seemingly poor showing notwithstanding, the
military had succeeded in forcing the Navaho from their
homes and grazing grounds into "the most desolute and
repulsive country" that Canby had ever seen. And there,
great numbers of their horses and sheep were reputed to be
dying of hunger and thirst. 39
During the course of the operations, various elements of
the Navaho tribe made overtures for peace. To these repre~entations, Canby responded. There was to be· no cessation
of hostilities until the whole Nation willingly submitted, "in
good faith," to any terms which the United States might
impose upon it. Though the petitioners protested their past
and present friendship, declared themselves opposed to the
war, and claimed that the ladrones, or bad men, of their Nation were the cause of all the trouble, Canby remained adamant. He replied that the Nation was responsible for the
action of all its men, and that until it brought the .ladrones
under control, or eliminated them, or helped the troops to do
so, he refused to listen to their pleas. 40 His stand, moreover,
was in full accord with the position taken almost simultaneously by the department commander. 41 No immediate renewal
of the overtures followed these pronouncements, but, shortly
thereafter, Canby learned that a collision had occurred
between the Navaho war and peace factions, in which blood
had been spilled over this issue. 42
At this juncture, Colonel Fauntleroy authorized Canby to
take any steps that might be deemed necessary if the prose38.
39.
40.

Canby to A. A. G., November 17, 1860. ibid., C53, 1860.
[d. to id.• November 8, 1860, ibid., C49. 1860.
[d. to id., November 10, 1860, ibid., C50, 1860.

41.
42.

Maury to Canby, November 11, 1860, Dept. of N. M.• LB, X, 495, No. 283.
Canby to A. A. G., November 10, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, C50, 1860.
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cution of winter operations was thought advisable. And he
forthwith offered to place four more companies under the
lieutenant colonel's command for that purpose. 43 In reply to
his superior's communication, Canby presented his views
on the situation at hand.
He had been seriously considering the possibility of winter operations ever since the start of the campaign. Canby
stated that from the beginning he had known that the
Navaho policy was not to fight, and he was convinced that·
they would not fight unless driven to points from which there
was no escape or unless forced to do so in defense of their
families and flocks. But the recent operations disillusioned
him. Even when the Navaho were pursued to the extreme
limits of their domains, the nature of the country still permitted them to escape. He also discovered that they were
willing to abandon family and precious livestock rather
than engage the troops in whatever numbers. "Inhabiting a
country of considerable extent; greatly diversified in features and climate; destitute of resources and impracticable
for military operations to an extent that can only be realized from personal observation," Canby was certain that the
subjugation of the Navaho could not be accomplished in one,
or two, or, for that matter, three campaigns. He believed that
the work of a "continued and persistent" war, in summer
and winter, was required to turn the trick.
As the war party was now the dominant element in the
Navaho Nation, Canby maintained that no permanent peace
could be expected until they were ousted from power.
ON THE NAVAHO TRAIL

a

Deriving their subsistence to 'great extent from the robberies
they commit, having little to lose and much to gain by the continuation
of the war, it will undoubtedly be protracted by them so long as they
can wield the power which they now possess of intimidating and controlling the wealthier and less warlike part of the Nation.

He realized the futility of trying to discriminate between
the two, unless, that is, the "peaceable and well-disposed"
Navaho cooperated with the troops. This division of the
Nation, however, could not be brought about, Canby was
430

Maury to Canby, November 11, 1860, Dept. of No Mo, LS. X, 495, No. 283.
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persuaded, until the more well-to-do elements of the tribe
were made to suffer greater injuries than they had thus far
sustained. "Any peace that may be made before this result
is attained would be a farce," he declared.
He therefore decided to direct his subsequent operations
against that class in an effort to "obtain a final settlement
of this question." To effect his policy of divide and conquer,
Canby proposed to occupy certain strategic points in the
Navaho country from which he could keep the Navaho in the
desert by summer and in the mountains by winter. Hitting
at the herds and flocks which constituted their main source
of wealth, he hoped to get them to acquiesce. 44
The decision to continue the campaign during the winter
was just what the War Department ordered-in a directive
received by Canby early the next month. 45 From mid-November until March, patrols were constantly in the field, ferreting out the Navaho and harassing them with relentless pursuit. Moving with as much secrecy as possible, they scouted
around the circle for the foe. 46 Often, they encountered him
not at all. But, in covering a wide expanse of territory, they
at least examined areas heretofore unexplored. Where major
Indian signs were found, as in the case along the Puerco,
Canby established temporary supply depots in the vicinity
in order to save the troops time and enable them to move
without the encumbrance of transportation. 47 Navaho
parties which were surprised were attacked with the utmost
vigor. No warriors were taken, but, by Canby's orders, all
women and children captured were immediately released
with instructions to inform their people that there would be
no let-up in the operations until "the whole Nation" asked
for peace. 48
44.
45.

Canby to A. A. G., November 12, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR. 054. 1860.
See Maury to Canby. November 30. 1860, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 508, No.

314.
46. See Canby to A. A. G., November 16, December 11, 1860, January 6, 14, and
28, and March 18. 1861, Dept. of N. M., LR, C52, C57. 1860, C11, C17. and Enclosure
in C34, and Enclosures in C42, 1861, respectively.
47. Id. to id., December 11 and 24, 1860. ibid., C57, 1860 and C2, 1861, respectively.
48. See Maury to Fauntleroy, October 20. 1860, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 489, No.
269.
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While the results of anyone of the patrols was relatively unimportant,49 in totality their achievements were
material. 50 Canby learned from captive Navaho that the
Nation was "greatly perplexed and harassed" by the tactics
employed. They lived in constant. dread of surprise and,
consequently, kept steadily on the move. Rarely did they
spend more than two nights in the same camp. They had lost
a great deal of stock by capture and from forced abandonment in their hasty flights. 51 By February, a large number
of them were "reduced to the verge of starvation." 52 ..
Usually the saying, "As well might we send boys into a
cornfield to catch marauding crows . . . as to start footsoldiers in pursuit of Indians," was true. 53 But the equalizing effects of snow and cold weather, sometimes down to
16 0 below,54 contradicted, in part, the generalization that
"Infantry in the Indian country . . . are about the same use
as so many stumps."55
In his reports to the department commander, Canby
commended the troops for their zeal and exertions,56 and, in
~urn, Colonel Fauntleroy bolstered the expedition's morale
with words of praise for its efforts. 57 Moreover, the colonel
also called the attention of the General-in-chief to his subordinate's energetic and able conduct of the campaign. 58 The
governor of the Territory, in his December message to the
legislature, announced that he was informed that the operations were being executed by "Colonel Canby . . . with a
vigor and success as honorable to himself as to the valiant
49. Fauntleroy to Thomas, January 31. 1861, A. G. 0 .• LR, 31 New Mexico De·
partment, 1861. Also see Canby to A. A. G., January 6, 1861, Dept. of N. M.• LR. cn,
1861.
50. Canby to A: A. G.• January 28, 1861, Dept. of N. M., LR, C34. 1861.
51. [d. to id.• January 6. 1861. ibid.• cn. 1861.
62. [d. to id.• January 28, 1861, ibid.• C34. 1861.
53. Quoted from the Daily Missouri Republican in A. B. Bender, "The Soldier
in the Far West," Pacific Historical Review, VIII (June, 1939), 161. 1848-1860.
54. Canby to A. A. G.• January 6 and 28. 1861. Dept. of N. M.• LR, cn and C34,
1861. respectively.
55. Bender. "The Soldier in the Far West." loco cit.• 162.
56. See, for example, Canby to A. A. G., January 6. 1861. Dept. of N. M.• LR,
cn, 1861.
67. ·Maury to Canby, November 30, 1860. Dept. of N. M.• LS, X. 608, No. 314.
68. Fauntleroy to Thomas, January 12, 1861. ibid.• 639, No. 22.
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troops under his command."59 All this was deeply gratifying to Canby.60During December, frequent overtures for a cessation of
hostilities were made. Canby began to hope that most of the
tribe would accede to the conditions which he had specified
as a necessary preliminary to peace. With their assistance,
the troops could then establish the identity and punish the
bands to which the rest of the Nation charged the responsibility for all the robberies and killings that had occurred.
This policy seemed to him to afford the surest way of effecting a speedy and permanent peace with the Navaho people. 61
On December 23, Canby advised the department commander that he had named the twelfth of January as the
day for a meeting with the Navaho chiefs. "I have consented
to this appointment," he explained, "from a conviction, that
there is now a strong disposition on the part of the Navajos
to submit to such conditions as will put an end to the War.
. . ." He did not expect immediate peace.to result from the
conference, "but the discussion of the question in the Nation," would, he believed, "test the relative strength of the
peace and war parties and force the better class of Navajoes
to side with the Troops in the prosecution of the War." In
any event, there was to be no interruption of active operations. 62
On the appointed date, a delegation of three, representing
the principal chiefs of the Nation, met with Canby at Fort
Fauntleroy. The lieutenant colonel repeated the conditions
which he had set forth previously and endeavored to impress
upon the deputation, "fully and explicitly," the Nation's
present and future responsibility for the acts of its people.
The chiefs expressed their willingness to abide by his demands and affirmed their determination to make war on
their bad men at once. They asked, however, that some arrangement be made whereby their families would be safe
from molestation by the troops while they were engaged in
59.
60.
61.
62.

[Abraham Rencherl, Message of the Governor of New Mexico, 1860, 17.
Canby to A. A. G., December 18, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LR, C5, 1861.
ld. to id., December 11, 1860, ibid., C57, 1860.
ld. to id., December 23, 1860, ibid., Cl, 1861.
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hunting down the ladrones. After receiving the delegation's
assurances that they thoroughly comprehended the implications of everything to which they agreed, Canby, "upon
deliberate consideration," consented to a partial armistice. 63
The terms of the truce applied only to the country west
of Fort Fauntleroy, and its extension was contingent upon
the outcome of the conference which all the chiefs of the
Nation were to attend on the fifth of February. The deputation was warned that if the tribe allowed any ladrones to
take refuge in the areas exempted from operations by the
armistice, such conduct would be regarded as a breach of
faith. 64 But although he told the delegation that the conclusion of a treaty depended upon their suppression of the
ladrones, Canby really didn't believe that they could accomplish the task alone. The outlaw bands, at least two in number and of indeterminate size,65 were supposed to be very
powerful, being composed of "the most warlike and desperate men of the Nation." He appreciated the fact that "it
will hardly be in the power of the peace party to subdue them
without . . . assistance." If the coming conference ended
favorably, however, he proposed to move against them.
And with the help of the friendly chiefs, he had "sanguine
hopes of success."66
Canby came away from the meeting with the feeling that
the Navajo fully recognized the necessity for submission.
A "Treaty satisfactory in its terms and in its promise of
permanency may now be made," he announced. 67 Accord'ingly, he turned his attention to the problem of drafting a
treaty.
ON THE NAVAHO TRAIL

Owing to the peculiar situation, habits and organization of this
Nation [Canby wrote the department commander] it will be extremely
difficult to manage the terms and conditions of a Treaty so that its
stipulations shall be free from future doubt or cavil. . . .

He had further:
63. [d. to id., January 13, 1861, ibid., C16, 1861.
64. [d. to id., January 14, 1861, ibid., C17, 1861.
65. These were the bands of Armijo Viejo and Gallegos. [d. to id., January 13,
1861, ibid., Enclosure in C34, 1861.
66. [d. to id., January 15, 1861, ibid., C18, 1861.
67. [d.·to iii., January 13, 1861, ibid., C16, 1861.

56

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

to guard against the disturbing elements that will constantly militate
against its permanency until a greater degree of isolation from their
immediate neighbors can be secured and some material changes effected
in their tribal organization and nomadic habits. 68

On learning that Colonely Fauntleroy would not be able
to attend the conference, Canby submitted for that officer's
consideration the provisions which, in his judgment, ought
to be embraced in the treaty.69 These terms the department commander approved, and in the letter conveying his sanction, the department adjutant concluded:
. . . he believes that the best guarantee he can have of the proper
adjustment of the difficulties with the Navajos, lies in the untrammeled
exercise of your judgment [sic]. To which he confidently entrusts the
whole business. 7o

On February 5, the council was held, only to find that
most of the chiefs had not yet arrived. Canby refused to
permit proxies, and since snow and bad weather had obviously detained many of the chiefs, he postponed the conference until the fifteenth. 71
When that day dawned, twenty-four of the Navaho chiefs
were present. The pow-wow commenced. And Canby was
ready. During the past month-even more, since Decemberhe had availed himself of every opportunity to become familiar with the character, standing, and influence of each chief
with whom he had to dea1. 72 He found out as much as he
could about Navaho characteristics, disposition, and habits,
and ascertained as nearly as possible their present circumstances and resources. Upon this information, he based his
actions in the conference. 73
Immediately after it was over, Canby, in a note to Colonel
Fauntleroy, pronounced the results of the meeting "satisfactory."74 This is what had happened:
68.
69.
70.
No. 35.
71.
72.
73.
.74.
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Maury to Canby (Confidential), January 27, 1861, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 540,
Canby to A. A. G., February
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The chiefs surrendered unconditionally. They accepted
the duty of controlling their people and suppressing the
ladrones, and they promised not to harbor them. They also
agreed to confine the movements of their Nation to the area
west of Fort Fauntleroy. They elected a head chief, to whom
they pledged allegiance, and they delegated twelve of their
number to arrange the details of the proposed treaty.
But this affair was not all one-sided. When the combinations of outlaws became too strong for the Navaho chiefs to
handle, Canby promised the assistance of the troops. Moreover, he guaranteed to those who conformed to the provisions
of the treaty the protection of the government.
A convention was thereupon entered into by Canby and
the Navaho chiefs. Another general council was provided for,
to meet three months hence. In the interim, Canby was to
decide whether the Navaho were able to comply with the
conditions imposed upon them. If they were, the treaty was
to become final. 75
At first, Canby had been disposed to exact "the most extensive conditions" from the Navahos, but their "reduced and
impoverished" status induced him to limit the requirements
to their ability to comply with them. "Justice and policy"
dictated such a course. As he later explained to Colonel
Fauntleroy:
The stipulations that I have made in their favor have been those
only which I consider it proper to make with a view to an absolute
and permanent peace. For the same reason I have not exacted from
them conditions which it is absolutely impossible for them to fulfil
and the subsequent enforcement of which would inevitably lead to the
indefinite continuation of hostilities and ultimate extermination of the
Nation. 76

Soon after the meeeting, Canby went to Fort Defiance to
check up on the behavior of the Navaho living in that neighborhood. 77 By March 1, he had seen all the important chiefs,
thirty-two had signed the treaty, and a twenty day dead-line
75. See id. to id., February 18, 1861, and General Orders No. 14, February 19,
1861, Navajo Expedition and a copy of the Treaty in ibid., 032, 1861.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
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had been set for those who hadn't. "I am satisfied with the
present disposition of the Navajos," Canby informed the
department commander. "Whether this will continue when
the immediate pressure is removed must be determined by
the future but," he continued, "I am hopeful of the result if
they can be secured from outside aggressions." 78
That problem was "one of the gravest difficulties" that·
had to be apprehended in maintaining peace with these
people. 79 That is why Canby delimitated the area that they
were to occupy and suggested that the territorial inhabitants,
red and white, be advised of the new state of affairs. 80
In October, 1860, great numbers of Mexicans had been
reported as over-running the Navaho country.81 Colonel
Fauntleroy had informed the General-in-chief, as early as
September 9, that the unfortunate relations which rendered
necessary active operations was attributable, in part, to the
system of retaliatory and predatory incursions persisted in
by the citizens of the Territory. He had anticipated "trouble
and embarrassment" from the volunteer units which were
then being organized and armed "with the avowed purpose
of invading the Navajo country. . . ." He foresaw that the
officer whom he had chosen to conduct the campaign was
likely to be "disconcerted" by their interference. 82 But notwithstanding his assurances that there were regulars enough
to perform the task, the War Department's admonition that
their movement "must be discountenanced and prevented,"
and the Territorial governor's belated and half-hearted
efforts to dissuade them, companies of New Mexico volunteers took the field anyway.83
Colonel Fauntleroy was authorized by the Secretary of
War to take "efficient but quiet means" to keep these irregulars from the field. No support or assistance was to be given
78. All had to ratify the treaty, see ibid. Also id. to id., March 1, 1861, ibid. Enclosure in C34, 1861.
79. ld. to id., February 19, 1861, ibid., C32,1861.
80. ld. to id., March 18, 1861, ibid., C42, 1861. Also see Fauntleroy to Rencher,
February 27, 1861, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 558, No. 83.
81. Maury to Fauntleroy, October 20, 1860, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 489, No. 269.
82. Fauntleroy to Thomas, September 9, 1860, A. G. 0., LR, 92 New Mexico Department, 1860.
83. Ibid.; S. Cooper, A. G., to Fauntleroy, October 29, 1860, A. G. 0., LS, XXXIII,
58; and House Exec. 'Doc. No. 24, 36th Cong., 2d sess., 8 et seq. ,
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to them. And when they came to the posts, or in the vicinity
of the troops, they were to be deprived of their booty and
sent out of the Indian country. Moreover, these measures
were to be "executed with decision, but without clamor or
harshness. . . . "84 So quietly, or so little, was this injunction
carried out that it is not known to what extent the operations
were hampered by private action. But starting February 27,
1861, this subject was referred to repeatedly.
A few days before, a party of thirty-one New Mexicans
from Taos had arrived at Fort Defiance in a starving condition. They had, some time prior, killed one man and six
women and childen, while capturing four women. But by
their own admission, they had nothing personal against the
Navaho. The prisoners were taken from them and returned
to their families. "As a matter of humanity," the New Mexicans were issued rations. Thereupon, these rogues, in making their way to Fort Fauntleroy, committed "wanton aggressions" upon property belonging to Navaho who had
remained friendly all during the recent campaign. Arriving
at the latter post, the New Mexicans obtained provisions to
carry them back to the settlements and ten of their number
received medical attention from the post surgeon for an
illness which unfitted them for travel. Nevertheless, they
proclaimed their intention to disregard the treaty and, after
reaching home, were determined to organize another expedition to capture Navaho and sell them "over the river." The
inhabitants of other towns were said to be similarly resolved.
Unfortunately, there was nothing that Canby could do to
stop them, for that was in the province of the civil police
power.
Two Navaho, who were permitted to go east of Fort
Fauntleroy, were openly 'killed by New Mexicans. On the
twenty-fourth, two Navaho scouts in the service of the
United States, wearing distinctive markings, were fired upon
by a party from Jemez. One was killed and promptly
scalped. On March 11, half a hundred New Mexicans rustled
forty or fifty horses owned by a band of Navaho who were
living fifteen miles within the treaty-defined boundary. On
84.

Cooper to Fauntleroy, October 29, 1860, A. G. 0., LS, XXXIII, 58.
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the eighteenth of March, the Navaho reported another inroad by the same people, near the northeastern end of the
Tunicha Mountains. The people of fifteen rancherias were
killed or carried off. And in this instance, the families
harmed were those of some chiefs who were at that moment
absent recovering stolen property for the government. 85
More than four hundred soldiers were employed along
the line to give protection to this part of the frontier. The
Navaho chiefs were doing their utmost to stop the perpetration of depredations on the settlements by members of their
tribe. 86 "It is obvious," Canby declared, "that the best efforts
of the troops and the Navaho chiefs will be utterly useless
unless this marauding disposition can be restrained." 87. He
confessed that,"It is discouraging to find that the past labors
of the troops are likely to be defeated by acts of this character and that we have reason to fear that there is no better
prospect for the future."88 Somewhat in desperation, the
lieutenant colonel asserted that he would not hesitate to
treat as enemies ofthe United States any New Mexicans or
Indians who might be found in the country assigned to the
Navaho, while the latter were conforming to the conditions
of the treaty. But, as this was a matter of general policy, he
left it to the department commander to decide. 89
Early in April, Lieutenant Colonel Canby visited Santa
Fe fora few days. While there, he was interviewed by a representative from the Gazette and, in discussing the Navaho
situation, he expressed the sentiments which had governed
his actions to date. Referring to his remarks, the newspaper
commented:
It is most sincerely to be hoped that the anticipations of Col. Canby
will'be fully realized. Should he be able to bring the Navajos to terms
and establish permanent peaceable relations between them and the
citizens of the Territory, he will be entitled to the greatest credit and
will be heartily thanked. , .. 90

85.

Canby to A. A. G., Dept. of N. M., February 27; ibid.• March 11, C40; ibid.,
March 18, C42, 1861.
86. Id. to id., March 11, 1861, ibid., C40, 1861.
87. Id. to id., February 27, 1861, ibid.
88. Id. to id., March 11, 1861, ibid., C40, 1861.
89. Id. to id., February 27, 1861, ibid.
90. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, April 13, 1861.
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But Canby was not to receive the plaudits of the territorial populace. Though the armistice which he had made in
February was extended in May, to last for a year, Navaho
incursions were soon renewed-and at a time when the de.,.
partment commander's undivided attention was urgently
needed elsewhere.
Where then did someone err? What factors were not
taken into consideration? Whose f~tUlt was it that the efforts
of six long months went for naught?
Basicly, the Government's policy which regarded tribes
as political entities was wrong. In this case, the warriors of
the Navaho Nation, some 1,800 in number,91 had great personal freedom. The office of chieftain was unstable. Ability
in war and possession of wealth influenced the choice. The
head chief was a war chief, and enjoyed no authority in time
of peace. 92 When Canby, guided presumably by the treaty
of December, 1858, made the Navaho elect a figure-head, and
called for collective responsibility, he fell into the same error
(if it is any compensation) that his immediate predecessor,
and many another government officer, had committed. 93
The methods employed in bringing the Navaho to terms
were not those which a strict adherence to War Department
mandate admitted. The Secretary of War, in far-off Washington, had decreed the following general rule:
Both humanity and policy dictate that all efforts should have for
their object to inspire them [the Navajos] with fear by a few decisive
blows for the destruction of life; and not to impoverish them by
wantonly destroying their flocks and herds. The latter course must
inevitably convert the whole tribe into robbers, and leave no hope for
relief from their depredations except by their extermination. An alternative the Government wishes to avoid. 94

That would have been the ideal way to conduct the war.
91. The American Annual Cyclopedia . •• [for) 1861 (New York, 1862). 375,
gives the population of the tribe a. 9,000. Figuring the warrior. to be one-fifth the
total, the number arrived at is 1,800.
92. Lipps, op. cit., 56-57. Also see Jacob P. Dunn, Jr., Massacres of the Mountains ••• (New York, 1886), 254.
93. It is interesting to note the similarities in the treaties of December, 1858, and
February, 1861. See Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico," loco cit., 229-230,
for the provisions of the former.
94. Cooper to Fauntleroy, October 29, 1860, A. G. 0., LS, XXXIII, 58.
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But, under the circumstance~, how could the results desired
have been achieved? It is hard to see how the troops could
have delivered so decisive a blow as the War Department
contemplated, when they experienced such difficulty in catching up with the elusive foe. Canby followed the Secretary's
directive as closely as possible, but, with the department
commander's full approval, he seized Navaho flocks in the
belief that the Bureau of Indian Affairs would care for the
indigent. No evidence has been found, however, that the Bureau furnished food to those left in danger of starvation by
the war. And that practice, Canby thought, was the "cheaper
remedy" for preventing future depredations. 95
It is unfortunate that Canby's efforts were futile, particularly as, "In addition to professional [reasons]," he felt
"a personal interest in doing the utmost for the permanent
settlement of the Navaho troubles."96 Still, in view of past
occurrences, and even though the final responsibility rested
with Colonel Fauntleroy, he should have known better than
to make peace with the Navaho. Or, at least, he should have
been more cautious in doing so. It was obviously inconsistent
to demand collective responsibility on the part of the Navaho,
when he could not enforce his own promises to protect them
from outside aggressions. Yet even that would have been
all right, had the territorial officials taken steps to restrain
the citizens of the Territory. But the long-standing feud between the New Mexicans and the Navaho caused them to
condone many acts which should otherwise have been punished. The Navaho retaliated and the situation resumed the
status quo ante bellum. 97
The means of the command also limited Canby. He knew
that the subjugation of the Navaho required more than the
present campaign. But there was no reason why he shouldn't
hope that what had been done, might actually be all that was
needed to keep them in line. Perhaps he was blinded by his
own desire for peace-or maybe the Navaho chiefs outsmarted him, never really intending to fulfill their promises.
96.
96.
97.
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At any rate, he was willing to see if a new treaty wouldn't
work. And so was Colonel Fauntleroy.
But there was yet another factor which contributed to
the failure of the campaign. There is no question that the
almost immediate withdrawal of the troops from the Navaho
country constitutes an important reason why inroads upon
the settlements were soon resumed. The hostile attitude of
the Mescalero and other bands of Apaches required the presence of the troops elsewhere. But more than that, "the financial embarrassments of the Department, growing out of the
disturbed conditions of our Country," made recall absolutely
necessary. As the department adjutant divulged in a confidentialletter to Lieutenant Colonel Canby on February 24,
"The latest intelligence from home (of date Washington City
-Feby.8) is not calculated to abate the anxiety which now
oppresses every mind." 98
Much had happened in national affairs while the Navaho
campaign was going on. Lincoln's election had resulted in the
secession of the lower South. In February, as Canby was concluding negotiations with the Navaho chiefs, Brevet Major
General David E. Twiggs, U. S. A., was surrendering the
United States troops (nearly one-fifth the whole army), the
military establishments, and all the public property in Texas
to the Texan "Commissioners on behalf of the Committee of
Public Safety." 99 Many officers were resigning and were 'going with their States.' With April came Sumter. The call for
troops, the resulting secession of the upper South, and the
stage was set for the internecine struggle.
In the ninth military district of the United States the
last abortive Navaho expedition was over. Four years of
civil war were in the offing. All that was awaited to make
New Mexico the battleground of the far west was the Confederate invasion of the Territory. Once repulsed, attention
was again focused on the Nation of the Navaho. 1OO
98. Maury to Canby, February 24, 1861, Dept. of N. M., LS, X, 555, No. 77.
99. Colonel Carlos A. Waite to Thomas, February 26, 1861, OR, I, 524. The surrender occurred on February 18.
100. See Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico," loco cit., 248 et ~6q.

